Title
The logic of American nuclear strategy : why strategic superiority matters / Matthew Kroenig.
ISBN
9780190870591 (ebook) :
Publication
New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Physical Description
1 online resource : illustrations (black and white)
Local Notes
Access is available to the Yale community.
Notes
Previously issued in print: 2018.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on January 4, 2018).
Access and use
Access restricted by licensing agreement.
Summary
What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the US need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the US needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the US has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory argues that the explanation is simple - policymakers are wrong. This work takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy.
Variant and related titles
Oxford scholarship online.
Other formats
Print version :
Added to Catalog
March 12, 2018
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.