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Planning to fail : the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan

Title
Planning to fail : the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan / James H. Lebovic.
ISBN
9780190937263 (ebook) :
Publication
New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Physical Description
1 online resource.
Local Notes
Access is available to the Yale community.
Notes
Previously issued in print: 2019.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on March 14, 2019).
Access and use
Access restricted by licensing agreement.
Summary
The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices.
Variant and related titles
Oxford scholarship online.
Other formats
Print version :
Format
Books / Online
Language
English
Added to Catalog
April 22, 2019
Series
Bridging the gap.
Oxford scholarship online.
Bridging the gap
Oxford scholarship online
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Audience
Specialized.
Citation

Available from:

Online
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