Librarian View
LEADER
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20200730064037.0
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190613s2002 miu fo a eng d
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(MiAaI)ICPSR01252
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MiAaI
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MiAaI
245
0
0
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Voting Rights, Private Benefits, and Takeovers
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[electronic resource]
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Frank A. Schmid
250
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2002-03-08
260
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Ann Arbor, Mich.
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Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]
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2002
490
1
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ICPSR
|v
1252
506
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Access restricted by licensing agreement.
516
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Numeric
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Title from ICPSR DDI metadata of 2019-06-13.
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AVAILABLE. This study is freely available to the general public.
530
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Also available as downloadable files.
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United States
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3
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This article analyzes the effects that institutional design of a firm has on the allocation of control over the firm's assets. The efficient allocation of control is a necessary condition for the optimal allocation of resources. Dynamic efficiency in resource allocation presupposes that control over firms will change hands when a given allocation becomes suboptimal. Typically, changes in control are brought about through (successful) tender offers or block trades. With regard to takeovers, a firm may have two types of value to consider: First, there is the public value of the firm, which is the market value of the firm's securities. Second, there may be a private value of the firm. The private value is the benefit an investor enjoys from exercising control over the firm. Private control benefits are most significant for entrepreneurial start-ups, for established family-owned businesses, and for organizations in which personal investors also pursue non-pecuniary goals, such as media groups or professional sports organizations. Of the legal arrangements identified in the finance literature, the most significant for wealth maximization in takeovers are the one share-one vote principle, majority rule, and mandatory tender offers. The authors analyze the implications of these three institutional arrangements in a simple textbook takeover model. The model helps in understanding the optimal design of a legal environment in which the market for corporate control promotes efficient allocation of capital.Cf: http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01252.v1
505
0
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Dataset
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Individual login required to download datasets.
590
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Access is available to the Yale community.
650
7
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corporate mergers
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icpsr
650
7
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corporate takeovers
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icpsr
650
7
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corporations
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icpsr
650
7
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investors
|2
icpsr
653
0
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ICPSR XVIII. Replication Datasets
700
1
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Schmid, Frank A.
|u
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
710
2
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Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
830
0
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ICPSR (Series)
|v
1252
852
8
0
|b
yulint
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None
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Online resource
852
8
0
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Online resource
856
4
0
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Online dataset
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https://yale.idm.oclc.org/login?URL=http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01252.v1
902
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Yale Internet Resource
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Yale Internet Resource >> None|DELIM|14430154
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online resource
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2019-06-14T14:08:40.000Z
946
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DO NOT EDIT. DO NOT EXPORT.
090
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yuldset
090
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yuldsetnum
300
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1 online resource
336
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computer dataset
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cod
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rdacontent
337
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computer
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c
|2
rdamedia
338
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online resource
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cr
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rdacarrier
655
7
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Data sets.
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lcgft
953
4
0
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http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01252.v1