Several recurrent "motifs" or modes of thought are argued to shape the doctrinal content of Karl Barth's mature theology: "actualism," "particularism," "objectivism," "personalism," "realism," and "rationalism." A study of these motifs offers a new way of reading Barth's Church Dogmatics--one not previously developed in detail. Earlier readings--those of Von Balthasar, Torrence, Berkouwer, Jensen and Hartwell--are contrasted to the one proposed here. The truly distinctive features of Barth's theology, it is suggested, can be seen and appreciated more clearly, without the lacunae of the earlier readings, once the motifs are identified and taken into account, both individually and in their inter-relations.

A way of reading is not something that can be "proven," but merely something that can be exemplified. After presenting the motifs in general outline, the proposed reading is exemplified by applying a study of the motifs to Barth's rich, complex and multifarious usage of the term "truth." "Truth as event" (actualism), "truth as unique in kind" (particularism), "truth as mediated" (objectivism), "truth as self-involving" (personalism), "truth as correspondence" (realism), and "truth as coherence" (rationalism), are all features of the conception of truth in theological discourse as Barth understands it. What emerges from the exercise is not a tightly constructed logical or conceptual scheme into which Barth's theology can be seen to fit, but rather merely a flexible but unmistakable repertoire of thoughtforms that are implicitly and explicitly brought to bear throughout Barth's argumentation. The motifs thus prove themselves to be useful categories of discernment, and the dissertation proves itself to be an exercise in pattern recognition.