"Too much invested to quit" [electronic resource] : the escalation of commitment in individual and group decision-making.

1989

1 online resource (170 p.)

Access is available to the Yale community

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 51-01, Section: A, page: 0211.

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An individual level explanation for escalating commitment based on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is extended to the group level of analysis. Hypotheses concerning the likelihood and degree of escalating commitment of individuals and groups were derived from the model and tested using six investment decision scenarios. Subjects responded to different decision dilemmas in which substantial funds have been invested in a failing course of action. Subsequent investment would likely exacerbate although could potentially reverse the situation. Results were generally supportive of the hypotheses derived from the model. In contrast to predictions based on expected utility theory, escalating commitment to a losing course of action occurred consistently in the escalation decisions of individuals that were negatively framed by sunk costs. Group decision making led to a further exacerbation of the frequency and severity of escalation. This exacerbation was most pronounced in escalation decisions that were negatively framed by personal responsibility for sunk costs.

Books / Online / Dissertations & Theses

English

July 12, 2011

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 1989.

Yale University.