Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 55-07, Section: A, page: 2039.

Chairman: Joel S. Demski.

The dissertation analyzes how optimal organizational structure depends on whether employees act cooperatively. Throughout, organizational structure refers to information systems, internal control procedures, and organizational design. I develop an agency model suitable for the study of cooperation. Within this framework, three different aspects of administrative and accounting control are studied. Cooperation may benefit the organization if the employees, by sharing effort, information, or risk, can enhance production or lower costs. However, cooperation can be detrimental if it leads to less effort or to withholding of information. It turns out that cooperation on production of goods may benefit the organization, while cooperation on monitoring is detrimental. Further, delegation of decision authority is beneficial for a broader range of organizations if employees collude.

Moreover, it is optimal to separate production of stewardship information and production of goods. However, if an organization gathers information to facilitate decision making, it may be optimal to allocate information production, dissemination of information, and production of goods to one agent. The value of allocating monitoring and production of goods to two separate agents--as opposed to allocating both tasks to one agent--increases in the productivity of the production process and in the probability with which the information partition reveals the (stochastic) productivity. Further, the agents' risk attitudes affect the allocation of tasks.

Finally, the value of participative budgeting in a multiagent setting is sensitive to the assumption of non-cooperative behavior on the agents' part. In particular, the organization disproportionately values better information systems if the employees cooperate. The manager is evaluated on his subordinates' production when the employees collude.