Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1 Minimal Content and Intentionality; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Privileged Access and Minimal Content; 1.3 Intentional States and Minimal Content; 1.4 Illustrative Applications of the Concepts; 1.5 Further Development of Some of the Fundamental Ideas Presented; 1.6 The Fundamental Intentional State; 2 More on Minimal Content and Related Issues; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Some General Remarks on Methodology; 2.3 So What, Then, Is Minimal Content?; 2.4 Yet Another Illustration of the Aptness of the Concept of Minimal Content; 2.5 Ontological Issues Set Aside.
2.6 Constituting and Grasping Minimal Content: Fregean, Cartesian, and Searlean Comparisons3 Thinking Differently About Thought and Language; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Standard Meaning and Standard Reference; 3.3 A New Theory of Thought; 3.4 The Fundamental Difference in the Current Theory From Alternatives; 4 The Superiority of the New Theory to Frege's; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Frege's Theory of Thought; 4.3 The Two Theories Compared; 4.4 The Object of Awareness; 4.5 The Perplexing Case of Dr. Lauben; 4.6 More Problems for Frege's Theory.
4.7 Failure of Frege's Stipulation Strategy and a Fundamental Problem for the Concept of Sense: Standard Meaning Prevails4.8 More on Different Language and Different Thought Problems; 4.9 Troubles for Frege's Discussion of 'I'; 4.10 Concluding Contrasts and Summary of the New Theory; 5 Kripke's Puzzle About Belief Solved; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Contrasting the Orthodox View of Belief with the New Theory; 5.3 Paderewski Puzzle; 5.4 'London'/'Londres' Puzzle; 5.5 Summary; 6 Use, Idiolect, and Statement Made; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Use and Idiolects; 6.3 Statement Made; 7 Speaker's Referent.
7.1 Introduction7.2 A Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent; 7.3 Kripke's Distinction: Speaker's Reference/Semantic Reference; 7.4 Residual Difficulty for the Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent Resolved; 8 Speaker's Referent and the Referential/Attributive Distinction; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 The Phenomenon at Issue in Alleged Referential Uses; 8.3 The Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent Applied to the Phenomenon; 8.4 Critique of Referential/Attributive Use of Definite Descriptions; 8.5 The Circle of Referential Use and Statement Made; 9 Proper Names; 9.1 Introduction.
9.2 Searle's 1958 Theory of Proper Names9.3 Did Kripke Refute Searle's Theory of Proper Names?; 9.4 Proper Names and Possible Worlds; 9.5 The New Theory Provides a Corrective to a Remaining Problem; 9.6 Brief Summary; 10 Solutions to Classic Problems; 10.1 Introduction; 10.2 Substitution in Propositional Attitudes; 10.3 Frege's Puzzle; 10.4 More on Substitution and Transparent/Opaque Reading; 10.5 Two Remaining Puzzles: True Negative Existentials and Empty Names; 10.6 Brief Summary; 11 Securing Determinate Meaning-Part I: Against Kripkenstein; 11.1 Introduction.