Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Table of contents; Preface to the third edition; Preface to the second edition; Preface to the first edition; 1 An initial survey; Introduction; Constitutive and evidential criteria; The bodily criterion; The brain criterion; The physical criterion; Objections to the physical criterion; The memory criterion; The psychological-continuity criterion; The circularity objection; The reduplication argument; The revised psychological-continuity criterion; The multiple-occupancy thesis; The simple view; The determinacy thesis
5 Identity and personal identityIntroduction; A puzzle; A solution; The simple and complex views; Reductionism and non-reductionism; Persons as endurers or persons as perdurers?; Parfitian reductionism; Conclusion; 6 Identity and determinacy; Introduction; The determinacy thesis; Types of indeterminacy; Indeterminacy as semantic indecision; The epistemic view; Indeterminacy and identity over time; Fuzzy objects; Indeterminacy and brain transplants; Indeterminacy and Methuselah; The determinacy thesis and personal perdurance; Objections to personal perdurance; Inconstancy in modal predication
Assessment of the argumentAnti-Parfit; The only-x-and-y principle revisited; Parfitian survival and trivial facts; 10 The self and the future; Introduction; Two puzzle cases; Body-switching?; Mind-swapping?; Identity and determinacy; Conclusion; 11 Persons, animals and human beings; Introduction; Animalism defined; Pluralism; Two pluralists; Transplants and remnant persons; Rejection of the argument from the transplant intuition; The animalist's arguments; The too-many-thinkers argument; The hybrid approach; Conclusion; 12 Against the closest-continuer theory; Introduction; the only-x-and-y principle revisited; The Vienna Circle; The self and the future; Fission.
Conclusion7 The reduplication problem; Introduction; The only-x-and-y principle; The ship of Theseus; Wiggins's argument; An alternative argument; Further objections; A counterargument countered; Cambridge change; The only-x-and-y principle reformulated; The multiple-occupancy thesis; Conclusion; 8 Quasi-memory; Introduction; The circularity objection; Quasi-memory; Quasi-memory and privileged access; The content of quasi-memory; M-connectedness and personal identity; 9 Parfit and what matters in survival; Introduction; Identity and survival; What does matter; Fission and survival
What matters in survivalParfit's argument; 2 Locke; Introduction; The principium individuationis; Substantial identity; Plants, animals and men; Personal identity and consciousness; 'Person': a forensic term; Consciousness; A much-debated passage; 3 Leibniz, Butler and Reid; Introduction; Discourse on metaphysics; The New Essays; Butler and Reid; The circularity objection; The Butler-Reid-Shoemaker objection; Conclusion; 4 Hume; Introduction; Our idea of identity; The reification of perceptions; Of soul and self; The source of the mistake; Objections to Hume; Conclusion