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Personal identity

Title
Personal identity / Harold W. Noonan.
ISBN
1315107244
1351606492
1351606506
1351606514
9781315107240
9781351606493
9781351606509
9781351606516
1138092835
1138092843
9781138092839
9781138092846
Edition
Third Edition.
Publication
New York : Routledge, 2019.
Physical Description
1 online resource
Local Notes
Access is available to the Yale community.
Notes
Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher.
Access and use
Access restricted by licensing agreement.
Summary
Who am I? What is a person? What does it take for a person to persist from one time to another? What is the relation between the mind and the body? These are just some of the questions that constitute the problem of personal identity, one of the oldest and most fundamental of philosophical questions. Personal Identity, Third Edition is a clear and comprehensive introduction to these questions and more. Harold Noonan places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, discussing the major historical theories and more recent debates. The book also includes essential historical and philosophical background to the problem of personal identity as found in the arguments of Locke, Reid and Hume among others. The third edition of Personal Identity has been thoroughly reviewed in light of advances in the latest literature and research. This includes significant revision to the important problems of the simple and complex distinction and its relation to reductionism; temporal parts; and the distinction between perdurance and endurance theorists. Noonan also includes an up to date examination of personal identity and memory and personal identity and animalism, particularly the work of Shoemaker, Parfit, Olson and hybrid theorists. Including helpful chapter summaries and annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, Personal Identity, Third Edition is essential reading for all students of philosophy of mind and metaphysics, as well as students interested in ethics.
Variant and related titles
Taylor & Francis. EBA 2024-2025.
Other formats
Print version: Personal identity New York : Routledge, 2019.
Format
Books / Online
Language
English
Added to Catalog
August 08, 2024
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Table of contents; Preface to the third edition; Preface to the second edition; Preface to the first edition; 1 An initial survey; Introduction; Constitutive and evidential criteria; The bodily criterion; The brain criterion; The physical criterion; Objections to the physical criterion; The memory criterion; The psychological-continuity criterion; The circularity objection; The reduplication argument; The revised psychological-continuity criterion; The multiple-occupancy thesis; The simple view; The determinacy thesis
5 Identity and personal identityIntroduction; A puzzle; A solution; The simple and complex views; Reductionism and non-reductionism; Persons as endurers or persons as perdurers?; Parfitian reductionism; Conclusion; 6 Identity and determinacy; Introduction; The determinacy thesis; Types of indeterminacy; Indeterminacy as semantic indecision; The epistemic view; Indeterminacy and identity over time; Fuzzy objects; Indeterminacy and brain transplants; Indeterminacy and Methuselah; The determinacy thesis and personal perdurance; Objections to personal perdurance; Inconstancy in modal predication
Assessment of the argumentAnti-Parfit; The only-x-and-y principle revisited; Parfitian survival and trivial facts; 10 The self and the future; Introduction; Two puzzle cases; Body-switching?; Mind-swapping?; Identity and determinacy; Conclusion; 11 Persons, animals and human beings; Introduction; Animalism defined; Pluralism; Two pluralists; Transplants and remnant persons; Rejection of the argument from the transplant intuition; The animalist's arguments; The too-many-thinkers argument; The hybrid approach; Conclusion; 12 Against the closest-continuer theory; Introduction; the only-x-and-y principle revisited; The Vienna Circle; The self and the future; Fission.
Conclusion7 The reduplication problem; Introduction; The only-x-and-y principle; The ship of Theseus; Wiggins's argument; An alternative argument; Further objections; A counterargument countered; Cambridge change; The only-x-and-y principle reformulated; The multiple-occupancy thesis; Conclusion; 8 Quasi-memory; Introduction; The circularity objection; Quasi-memory; Quasi-memory and privileged access; The content of quasi-memory; M-connectedness and personal identity; 9 Parfit and what matters in survival; Introduction; Identity and survival; What does matter; Fission and survival
What matters in survivalParfit's argument; 2 Locke; Introduction; The principium individuationis; Substantial identity; Plants, animals and men; Personal identity and consciousness; 'Person': a forensic term; Consciousness; A much-debated passage; 3 Leibniz, Butler and Reid; Introduction; Discourse on metaphysics; The New Essays; Butler and Reid; The circularity objection; The Butler-Reid-Shoemaker objection; Conclusion; 4 Hume; Introduction; Our idea of identity; The reification of perceptions; Of soul and self; The source of the mistake; Objections to Hume; Conclusion
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